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Abstract 
The article examines the historical processes and the motivations of contemporary Hungarian 
politicians to officially rehabilitate the memory of Cécile Tormay, the internationally acclaimed 
writer and founder of Hungary’s conservative women’s movement.  Through tracing the politics 
of remembering Tormay since World War II it demonstrates how Tormay’s recent reemergence 
as a new national icon was intimately tied to a decisive shift in the direction of Hungarian politics 
from a pro-Western stance to one that is openly hostile towards Western liberalism.  Tormay, part 
of the ruling elite in the authoritarian interwar Horthy regime, was a fierce anticommunist, 
antisemite, and staunch nationalist who rallied Hungarians to reclaim territories lost after World 
War I.   Already a national icon, Tormay became a central protagonist of one of the largest interwar 
political scandals in which she was accused of homosexuality and sleeping with the wives of high 
aristocrats.  Yet, stunningly, neither during the interwar years nor since 1989 has the scandal 
around her alleged homosexuality stopped centre-right and increasingly right wing (Fidesz) and 
far right (Jobbik) politicians from embracing her as Hungary’s ideal patriotic female figure of the 
past century.  Such a paradox the article contends can be explained by these regimes’ different 
approaches to public and private sexuality.   By making Tormay’s private sexuality irrelevant both 
the interwar and post-socialist conservative governments could hold up Tormay’s public vision of 
anticommunism, antisemitism, nationalism, and traditional gender norms as their own.   
 
Introduction 
The study of collective memory and changing national memory cultures in post-socialist 
East-Central Europe is a thriving field.  The vigour with which national governments across the 
former Eastern block have engaged in reevaluating and recreating their respective histories since 
1989 have provided a fertile interdisciplinary research area.  In general, scholars have identified 
trends that point to the restructuring of public memory along the lines of condemning the 
communist past while reviving and recreating national traditions.1  Having to invent useable 
pasts East-Central European governments along with civil and private organizations created and 
at times recreated national anniversaries, museums and monuments.  One of the most visible 
aspects of “correcting state-socialist interpretations” of history has been the replacement of 
public figures commemorated under socialism with new national patriotic historical luminaries, 
whom Communists parties had deemed unsuitable.  This article turns to an individual, whose 
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recent lustration by an increasingly right wing Fidesz led Hungarian government and the far right 
party Jobbik, is a perfect example of such a pattern, at least on the surface.  Certainly, as a writer 
and the president of Hungary’s interwar conservative women’s movement, Cécile Tormay serves 
as an ideal representative of the formerly condemned Christian conservative interwar era.  In the 
eyes of many, Tormay’s ardent nationalism, antisemitisim and conservative gender views would 
inevitably make her the embodiment of Hungarian national honour and greatness.   Yet, once we 
consider Tormay’s personal life, which fell conspicuously far from both her contemporary 
conservative as well as current right and far right visions, Tormay’s unreserved rehabilitation 
becomes all the more surprising.  For the purpose of this article conservative(s) refers to the 
governing parties of interwar Hungary between 1922 and 1938 (Egységes Párt (Unity Party) 
1922- 1931 and Nemzeti Egység (National Unity Party) 1932- 1930.  In the post 89 context 
conservative denotes those generally on right who identify with the legacy of interwar 
conservativsm, and prioritize furthering the interest of national (middle class) in terms of 
politics, culture and economics over political, cultural and economic liberalism. The term centre-
right is used to define Fidesz prior to 2008. Finally, the term far right is used to denote 
Hungarian parties following 1989 that believe in the fundamental restructuring of political and 
economic organization of the Hungarian state along radical anti-Communist, anitsemitic, and 
nationalist lines.2  So, why would conservative regimes in the interwar past and post 1989 parties 
on the right embrace a female figure whose personal life was smeared by one of Hungary’s 
largest (homo)sexual scandals?  How could conservatives and the far right commemorate a 
single woman who never married, did not have children, and was allegedly a lesbian as “one of 
the greatest Hungarians”?  And finally, what does looking at drama that unfolded over Tormay’s 
reinstatement reveal about the relationship between interwar Hungarian history and 
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contemporary politics? It is these questions that the article aims to address by analysing historical 
records, including court documents and newspaper articles from the interwar era, along with the 
examination of media representations of Tormay since 1989.  
 
Cécile Tormay: A Conservative Sappho? 
Perhaps there is no other prominent author in twentieth-century Hungarian 
literature who has been so unfairly plagued with forgetfulness as Cécile Tormay, 
all as the result of a very "successful" cultural policy.   Indeed, she should be placed 
among the greatest of our writers since until fairly recently she was the closest to 
being worthy of the Nobel Prize for Literature, which was not attained only due to 
her early death.3 
 
Indeed, in the eyes of many Hungarian people in the 1920s and 1930s, Cécile Tormay 
represented the “Great Saving Soul” of “Mutilated Hungary.”4  For most Hungarians as well as 
foreigners she was known as the writer of “Bujdosó könyv,” or An Outlaw’s Diary, an 
internationally recognised book about the evils of communism.5  The work was an account of 
Tormay’s alleged personal experience of the horrors of the so-called Aster Revolution following 
WWI and the subsequent short-lived Soviet Republic of Hungary. Having being part of the 
Habsburg Monarchy, in October 1918 Hungary became independent and in November 1918 
formed a Democratic Republic with a new social-democratic government. Amidst the increasing 
difficulties faced by the government, the communists rapidly mobilized under the leadership of 
Béla Kun and in March of 1919 proclaimed Hungary a Soviet Republic.6  While writing in first 
person, Tormay’s book spoke on behalf the Hungarian gentry and privileged classes whose 
former existence and power was wiped away by the Communists.7  And considering the 
prevailing fears of the ruling classes across Europe about the spread of the “Communist 
Menace,” we can understand why Tormay’s book was well received not only in Hungary but 
also abroad.8    
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Tormay, who had been recognized as an important literary figure through such works as 
People Between the Stones and The Old House changed genre and became overtly political with 
An Outlaw’s Diary.9  Similarly to her male counterparts and perhaps even more so than most of 
them, in An Outlaw’s Diary (1921) Tormay openly expressed her political views.  The book 
begins with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the establishment of independent 
Hungary.  The following is a short excerpt in which Tormay describes her feelings, as she was 
standing in front of the Hungarian Parliament when the establishment of the Hungarian 
Democratic Republic was announced publicly on November 16, 1918:  
It is to our everlasting shame that no single Hungarian rose to choke these 
words.  In the Hall of Hungary's parliament Lenin's agent could unfurl at his ease 
the flag of Bolshevism, could blow the clarion of social revolution and announce 
the advent of a world revolution, while outside, in Parliament Square, Lovászi and 
Bokányi, accompanied by Jászi, informed the people that the National Council 
had proclaimed the Republic.  On the staircase Károlyi made another 
oration.  Down in the square, Landler, Weltler, Preusz and other Jews glorified 
the Republic- there was not a single Hungarian among them. That was the secret 
of the whole revolution.  Above: the mask, Michael Károlyi; below: the foreign 
race has proclaimed its mastery.10 
 
As the excerpt reveals Tormay despised both the Social Democratic government and especially 
the subsequent Communist rule as alien to Hungary and to “true” Hungarians. In fact, no excerpt 
can sufficiently reflect the extent to which the two volumes of An Outlaw’s Diary expressed 
blatantly antisemitic, anti-liberal, and anticommunist views.  Tormay rants against Jews and 
Communists and provides detailed descriptions of their horrible misdeeds.  In stark contrast, she 
narrates the emerging Hungarian resistance in a glorious light.   The diary describes the sacrifices 
made to reclaim Hungary for real Christian Hungarians.   
Throughout the book Tormay portrays herself as one of the many heroes who were 
destined to fight the Judeo-Communist menace.  Not shy about highlighting her own role in 
aiding the resistance Tormay depicts herself as a spiritual leader who with her faith provided 
 	 5	
support in the direst moments.  “I am only a wandering flame, please take from my fire, carry it 
into the darkness, and use it to lighten up the homes, so we can wait for the dawn, when once 
again the morning will be Hungarian and Christian.  Because I swear to God, our morning will 
come.”11  Thus, having disparaged the “enemies” an Outlaw’s Diary also portrays the force of 
steadfast Christian, ethnic Hungarians as redemptive.  The story of counter-revolutionary forces 
(herself included) as the true representatives and heroic saviours of the nation, assured that once 
Admiral Miklós Horthy and the conservative forces secured control over the country, the book 
would gain literary success and its writer cultural and political prominence.12  Tormay was one 
of the people who welcomed “the Admiral on horseback” and their alliance proved beneficial for 
both.13 
With the restoration of conservative power in Hungary in 1920, Tormay became one of 
the most visible faces of what would be known as the Horthy era (1920-44).14  Admiral Horthy 
(Regent of Hungary during the interwar period) held Tormay in the highest regard and supported 
her professional and political pursuits, some of which –like becoming the first female editor in 
chief of the most prestigious conservative literary journal of the time, Napkelet (Eastern Sunrise) 
–had been previously unimaginable for women. 15  In turn, Tormay worked tirelessly for the 
Horthy led conservative Hungarian state.  As the celebrated writer of the An Outlaw’s Diary and 
as president of the National Association of Hungarian Women (NAHW), Tormay propagated the 
official Christian nationalist conservative doctrine.16   
Tormay’s celebrity was unsurpassed despite the fact that in the mid 1920s she was 
involved in the largest political scandal of the Horthy regime.  The scandal involved Countess 
Eduardina Pallavicini Zichy, her friend and co-founder of the conservative women’s 
organization, who along with Tormay, was part of Admiral Horthy’s closest political and cultural 
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circle.  Pallavicini’s husband, Count Rafael Zichy, who came from one of the noblest and 
politically empowered Hungarian families, filed for divorce based on charges of 
termèszetellenes, an “unnatural” relationship between his wife and Cécile Tormay. And while 
news of bickering aristocrats and serious power struggles among the political elite was not a 
novelty for Hungarians, filing for divorce because of a wife’s lesbianism was unprecedented and 
ensured the divorce’s immediate notoriety and its scandalous place in the public eye for years to 
come.  After four years and having been tried in three different courts the trial ended with 
denying the Count’s appeal for divorce and sentencing him for libel.17 
From the damning accounts given during testimony to the conflicting experts’ opinions 
the decision could have gone either way however, it was in the greatest interest of the interwar 
political leadership to clear Cécile Tormay’s name.  In addition to Horthy’s personal loyalty to 
Tormay, by the mid 1920s Tormay had come to represent the conservative authoritarian regime.  
Her works were considered to capture the experience and greatness of Hungary and Tormay 
herself was celebrated as a national icon.  Therefore, in the eyes of the political leadership an 
attack on an individual seen as the public face of the Horthy regime, even if it was about her 
personal life, was construed as an attack on the regime itself.  There are indications that it was 
the admiral himself who personally intervened into the judicial process to make sure that 
Tormay’s reputation remained untarnished. The diary of Páter Zadravecz, who was the Bishop of 
the Hungarian Military between 1920 and 1928 and a close friend of Admiral Miklós Horthy 
provides the most explicit and direct evidence of Horthy’s maneuverings.  In Secret Diary of 
Father Zadravecz, the former bishop recalls the time when Horthy told him that he “put pressure 
on” the judges of the trial to arrive to the desirable outcome. 18  At the end, the final rulings of the 
trial were a testament that an attack on Tormay was not to be tolerated.  The courts discredited 
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Count Zichy and sentenced him to prison while they went on to redeem the respectability of 
Hungary’s two most important female patriots, Cécile Tormay and Countess Zichy.  In the words 
of the judges in the criminal trial, 
On one hand, there stands a person [the Count] driven by an irresistible passion, who 
would not even hesitate or feel remorse for a committing crime and living an utterly 
selfish life. While, on the other hand, there are two intellectually and ethically high 
standing people who have been making important contributions to the betterment of the 
public, whose ethical purity has not been the tiniest bit overshadowed by this case.19  
 
In their verdict the judges made it unmistakably clear how people should remember the 
scandalous legal suit.  Thereby, not only was the outcome of the trial secured but so too was its 
legacy.20 
Consequently, despite her alleged love affairs with women and the fact that she never 
married and only lived with women did not seem to tarnish Tormay’s charisma. During the 
interwar era she endured as one of the most visible and intellectually recognized Hungarian 
female figures and also achieved considerable international attention.  She was nominated for the 
Nobel Prize in literature twice (1936, 1937) and following the death of Marie Curie in 1935, was 
selected into the Committee of Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations.  For the 
Hungarian political leadership Tormay remained the most visible female representative of 
Christian Hungary even following her death in 1937.  
 
Tormay’s Reemergence and Ascent to Prominence 
 Following World War II and the establishment of Communist Dictatorship in 1948, 
Tormay’s works were banned for their “fascist and anti-communist” content.  Her Christian 
conservative world view aside, at the time when countries in the Eastern Block were supposed to 
be one happy family under Soviet paternalism, her irredentist views demanding territorial 
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revisions were unpalatable at best.  During the four decades of Communism, Tormay’s name 
remained taboo and her works were only printed in émigré communities outside of Hungary.21  
The initial climate following 1989 and the end of the Cold War were similarly unreceptive to 
Tormay.  During the 1990s the public and politicians alike were interested in recovering 
Hungary’s democratic traditions.   New histories were needed that would show how despite 
Hungary’s historically rocky road, experiencing both left and right wing extremism and 
subjugation by Great Powers (whether the Ottoman, the Habsburg, or the Soviet Empire), 
Hungary was destined to be a democratic country.  Like elsewhere in the former Eastern Block, 
Hungarian officials had to (re)create historical traditions and usable pasts that were acceptable 
for a newfound democracy.22  Amidst the regional desire to join Western Europe, where 
according to the new national histories “they always belonged,” they also needed national role 
models from the past who embodied a new democratic spirit.  Concomitant to countries of the 
former Soviet block racing each other to gain membership in the European Union, was these 
countries’ desire to demonstrate their “Europeanism.”  As part of this undertaking, communist 
narratives, written and visual, were replaced by carefully selected pro-European histories and 
historical figures.23  Most visibly apparent, was how across East-Central Europe statues of 
democratic statesmen replaced formerly larger than life socialist statutes.24  In this climate, the 
memories of Cécile Tormay and the interwar era she represented remained latent in mainstream 
politics.  
Political changes brought an end to the six-decade long silencing of Tormay’s memory.  
Tormay, whose Bujdosó könyv had become a seminal work for members of the former national 
socialist émigrés living in the West, from the late 1990s was also becoming a household name 
within the incipient radical right in Hungary.25  However, it was not until following the political 
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realignment in 2004 and the global financial crisis of 2008 that her name would enter 
mainstream Hungarian discourse.  When it became clear that democracy could not fulfil the 
hopes and dreams of great segments of the population and in fact, that many faired worse under 
democracy than during Goulash Communism, Hungary went through a political realignment.  By 
Hungary’s entry to the European Union in 2004 politics had become polarized around two 
parties.  On one side stood the socialist (MSzP) while on the other was the centre-right Fidesz.26  
2006 saw the onset of radicalisation and realignment of Hungarian politics.  Soon after the re-
election of the socialist led government, the leaking of socialist Prime Minister Ferenc 
Gyurcsány’s private party speech – where he admitted that the socialists had been lying in order 
to be re-elected – led to mass protests and calls for the resignation of Gyurcsány and his 
government.27  Gyurcsány’s admission of systematic dishonesty to the public about the country’s 
economic prospects and the subsequent announcement of necessary austerity measures resulted 
not simply in the loss of credibility of MSzP but also in the meteoric rise of the Hungarian far 
right party Jobbik.28  
By 2008 the euphoric days of celebrating liberal capitalism and democracy were gone.  
At the same time, amidst growing financial problems and widening socio-economic inequalities, 
radical nationalist and anti-EU sentiments begin to gain serious traction for the first time since 
1989.  In an atmosphere of wide spread disillusionment the largest opposition party, Fidesz, and 
the rapidly rising radical far right party, Jobbik, expressed radical nationalistic and anti-EU 
sentiments29  Concomitant with a shift to populist nationalism there was a conspicuous change in 
the language of politics.  Along with ardent nationalism, anticommunism, and antisemitism, 
conservative gender norms came to dominate even mainstream political discourse.  The time was 
ripe for Tormay’s reemergence.30   
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Bújdosó Könyv was initially rediscovered at a time when anti-communist and antisemitic 
remarks were still considered to have no place in mainstream public discourse.  In the eyes of 
members of the far right and soon many on the right the book could express and vindicate their 
views about the ills of Hungarian politics and society.  And with the turn of political tides they 
discovered that the book’s writer, Tormay, had much more to offer.   In contrast to her more 
“modern” female contemporaries, like Margit Schlachta, Catholic social activist, writer, and first 
female member of the Hungarian parliament who supported women’s advancement and opposed 
anti-Jewish legislation, Tormay was a much more palatable figure.  As a successful conservative 
female writer and proponent of traditional gender norms, the ideologue of the formerly despised 
Horthy era could offer a new historical icon not only for the far right but also to the new right.31 
Tormay’s reappearance came in 2010 when following its landslide victory the Fidesz led 
government made the reestablishment of Christian nationalism a central goal.32   Aside from 
flexing its muscles vis-à-vis the European Union and the IMF the leadership’s aim to protect 
national interests also brought about a sea change in the assessment of Hungary’s interwar 
history.  Although since 1989 there had been an apparent diversification of points of views in 
considering Hungary’s history between the wars, official interpretations saw the interwar years 
in a critical light.  They tended to stress the era’s antisemitic and undemocratic policies and the 
increasingly authoritarian and fascist nature of governments that ultimately culminated in the 
Holocaust and murder of 600’000 Hungarian Jews.33  This was all about to change as the new 
government, fuelled by the far right and its Christian Democratic coalition partner, set out to 
introduce major reinterpretations of the history of the interwar era.34  Aided by government 
friendly conservative and populist critics and historians such as Mária Schmidt or László 
Tőkéczki, both democratic and communist revolutions of 1918-9 were portrayed in a purely 
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negative light.35  In addition, they also stressed the historical responsibility of the Arrow Cross 
Party and the Hungarian far right more generally in the Holocaust.36  Making the far left and far 
right responsible for all historical ills there could be a comprehensive effort to reclaim the 
Horthy regime as a popular and effective one with successful social and economic policies.37  
Cécile Tormay’s works would lend themselves to all of these efforts.  
As part of a 2010 government sponsored public campaign there were no less than 
fourteen different books of Tormay’s published, most of them seeing print for the first time since 
the 1930s.  Along with her books, Tormay’s literary and political significance increasingly 
occupied pro-government, right leaning media pundits.  The reprinting of Tormay’s An Outlaw’s 
Diary in 2010 could not have been timelier.  In its book review titled, the “Forgotten Genius” 
about “one of the greatest and most successful female writers” the largest centre-right paper 
announced, “Every Hungarian should read this book; it will help them understand the philosophy 
and demonic power of treasonous international bolshevism.”38  The reemergence of Tormay 
aligned with the reconstruction of Hungarian history around one of its most contentious 
periods—that of 1918-9.   As evidenced by articles and op-eds in the pro-Fidesz conservative 
daily Magyar Nemzet and also on the far right’s web-based publications such as Kuruc.info in 
the eyes of rightist and far right critics, the complete erasure of Tormay’s history following the 
establishment of Communist regime in 1948 was symbolic of the Communist distortion of 
Hungarian national history.39  They pointed out how throughout Communism (1948-1989) the 
democratic and communist revolutions of 1918 and 1919 were presented in a favourable light.  
This was particularly the case with the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, which was 
presented as a precursor of post World War II Communism.  Since 1989 this historiographical 
portrayal shifted and new histories stressed the disastrous and violent nature of the short-lived 
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Hungarian Soviet Republic.40  However, in their attack conservatives no longer wished to see 
even the democratic (Aster) revolution of 1918 as the precursor of democracy.  Now it was seen 
as the precursor to extreme far left violence and chaos and commentators relied on Tormay’s 
supposedly first hand accounts to confirm their view.   
The reprinting of Tormay’s An Outlaw’s Diary was a well-orchestrated event that 
provided a wide platform for attacking liberal and socialist opposition and also underscored an 
unmistakable conservative shift in the historical interpretation of Hungarian political history. 
Magyar Nemzet commented on the occasion of the (re)publication of Tormay’s works: 
The undeservedly forgotten Cécile Tormay became the target of left-wing 
liberalism, which even in the Horthy era conveyed a powerful influence, because 
in her two-part novel, “Bujdosó könyv,” [An Outlaw’s Diary], Tormay unveiled 
the treason of Mihály Károlyi, the Aster Revolution’s anti-Hungarian, anti-
nationalist nature, and the horrors of the Soviet Republic.  The contemporary 
press of the left, with practices that were similar to the current media’s, portrayed 
Tormay’s personal life in a despicable humiliating way chasing the writer 
suffering from heart disease to her death.  Few people are aware today, that Cécile 
Tormay was not only nominated for the Nobel Prize, but in fact was awarded this 
highest literary recognition in the world in 1937.  It was only her death in April of 
1937 and the strict rules of the Noble Prize [against posthumous awards] that 
stopped her from receiving it.41 
 
As this paragraph attests, gone were the subtleties of the 1990s, now the right launched a frontal 
attack.  They openly demanded not only the reexamination of Hungarian history but also its 
reinterpretation.  Tormay in these accounts appears not simply as a writer who had been unjustly 
shelved because of her politics but a writer who was also a legitimate voice in interpreting the 
history of 1918 and 1919.  Her new proponents, with the words of an article in Magyar Nemzet, 
believed that in Tormay a forgotten “authentic Hungarian voice” had been rediscovered.42  Most 
public media channels, which were now under government control celebrated the reemergence of 
Tormay and her works not just as the unearthing of a forgotten heroine but also cast her as 
someone whose life accomplishments and works had moral resonance for present and future 
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generations.43  As one of the chief journalists in Magyar Nemzet suggested it was time to focus 
on the positive aspects of Hungarian history and create a usable past within which future 
generations could find positive ideas and role models.44  
What was conspicuously absent in these portrayals was any open or explicit discussion 
about Tormay’s sexuality or private life.  Commentaries on the right used a tactic in which they 
avoided providing details about the sexual scandal involving Tormay while simultaneously 
dismissing it as false history.  The articles in Magyar Nemzet and on kuruc.info illustrate how 
even as they could not totally ignore it, publications of right and the far right managed to allude 
to the scandal in order to criticize media, which according to the right’s reinterpretation “chased 
the writer to her death.”45  Like most media sources Magyar Nemzet refused to explicitly discuss 
or provide any details about what the media during the 1920s accused Tormay of, and what in 
the view of Magyar Nemzet consequently caused her health to deteriorate.  Without any specific 
references to the nature of the scandal or questions about Tormay’s sexuality critics on the right 
condemned (contemporary and historic) left and liberal media for their supposedly immoral ways 
of reporting.46  According to this circular logic since socialist and liberal media sources were 
immoral in their reporting they also fabricated their stories and sensationalized their reporting.  
Hence, whatever Tormay was accused of was false.  For that reason, there was no discussion 
necessary about Tormay’s personal life.  The result of such tactics was that Tormay’s fame 
continued to rise. 
The Hungarian Academy of Arts dedicated 2012 as the year of commemoration for 
Tormay.  She was frequently in the national media, radio, television, and Internet.  Tormay’s first 
family novel A régi ház  [The Old House] was published as one of the books inaugurating the 
establishment of a National Book series that aimed to be representative of “the love of 
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Hungarians and of the Hungarian nation.”47  Reflecting their growing populism the increasingly 
right wing government made frequent references to Greater Hungary not only to court their own 
and far right constituencies but also, having granted preferential citizenship rights to ethnic 
Hungarians living outside of Hungary, to ensure a new and grateful voting block.48  Thus, the 
words “love of Hungarians and the Hungarian nation” embodied the populist’s nationalist 
platform that envisioned the cultural community of Hungary encompassing all ethnic Hungarians 
living in the pre-Trianon borders.49  The target audience was all Hungarians including Hungarian 
speaking minorities abroad; the aim was to “strengthen national self-esteem.”50  Accordingly, in 
order to restore Hungarian self-esteem it was important to identify and resurrect “appropriate” 
historical heroes who would reinvigorate national pride.  In the words of Imre Kerényi, the 
Prime-ministerial Commissioner for the series  “the heroes” were selected to be representative of  
“those who not simply wrote lyrical poetries, but also actually did something in order to raise the 
nation after Trianon.”51 These true heroes, like Cécile Tormay, were to symbolize defiant 
strength and the patriotic resilience of Hungarians.      
From 2010 onwards, the atmosphere was ripe for looking for new villains and 
rehabilitating historical figures from the interwar conservative era that during the pro-European 
Union times had been too controversial to touch.  The Fidesz led government became the first 
Hungarian government that openly expressed hostility against the EU (in terms of its economic 
austerity and minority policies) and put internal national concerns ahead of European integration.  
The right capitalized on, and by an aggressive media campaign further fuelled, anti-EU 
sentiments that had been steadily growing since 2008.52  Like most places in the former Eastern 
Block, people faced growing economic hardship, a shrinking social net, and a growing 
disillusionment with politics and the European Union.  On the international scene, Prime 
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Minister Viktor Orbán was aggressively working on “reinstating Hungary’s autonomy” vis-à-vis 
the powerful decision makers of the EU and encouraged other small member states to do the 
same.53  His efforts raised alarm on the international scene and commentators highlighted his 
arrogant personality along with his party’s (Fidesz) nationalistic, and undemocratic politics.54  At 
home however, his fight, which was portrayed as one of “David vs. Goliath”, proved popular 
among Hungarians.    
Sticking up for Hungary’s interest within the EU, on the national front the government 
continued to reframe and institutionalize their revisionist version of Hungarian history.  The 
rewriting of the Hungarian Constitution in 2011 was only the most conspicuous example of the 
seriousness with which leading rightist elites took the fundamental restructuring of the history of 
the Horthy era.  Utilizing print and visual media, the Fidesz led government became intent on 
making the interwar period exemplary of conservative Christian order and fierce patriotism.55  
This is most explicit in the new constitution or Basic Law.  As the national avowal of the Basic 
Law states, “[W]e date the restoration of our country’s self-determination, lost on the nineteenth 
day of March 1944, from the second day of May 1990, when the first freely elected organ of 
popular representation was formed.”56  By bracketing the Horthy era as having ended either with 
Hungary’s entry into World War II in 1941 or alternatively with the German occupation in 
March 1944, the right could exonerate the interwar regime of the Holocaust and ethnic 
cleansing.57  Having been vindicated, it was time to celebrate the accomplishments and legacy of 
the Horthy regime.  Cultural events sprung up nationwide to reclaim the venerable place of 
interwar culture and society.  Reflecting official policies these events with titles such as 
“Suspended and forgotten:  The years of silence and silencing in Hungarian literature,” aimed to 
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restore conservative literary works and their authors, while making an overt stab at the socialist 
past.58 
 
Remembering and Constructing Gender  
Restoring honour into the Hungarian public consciousness notwithstanding, it was no 
accident that Tormay was so warmly embraced.  Her conservative ideas about the specific 
responsibilities of men and women in serving their country also lent itself to Fidesz’s goal of 
restoring “the sanctity” of Hungarian families. As the government was rewriting the Hungarian 
constitution to legally enshrine and define family as a heterosexual marriage with children, the 
resurrection of Tormay’s interwar ideas about the preeminence of the collective over the 
individual could not have been timelier.59  In Tormay’s view, women in Hungary until World 
War I enjoyed a sheltered and fulfilling life in the home.  During the upheavals of the war 
women were employed in unprecedented numbers in previously “male” occupations and 
contributed to the war efforts.  However, according to Tormay it was time to return to their 
homes, as it was there, where Hungarian women would become members of the counter-
revolution.  Thus, ironically, very unlike Tormay herself who was unmarried and had a visible 
public profile, she believed that women should help to reclaim Christian Hungary only by 
providing moral support to their husbands at home.  What Christian Hungary required from 
women, according to Tormay, was “the Holy Trinity for which we are meant to stand: a 
Christian and patriotic policy, the integrity of the country, and the sanctity of the family.”60 
Similarly to right wing and conservative interwar women’s movements across Europe the 
Tormay led National Association of Hungarian Women believed that women should “complete” 
their male counterparts within the private domestic sphere, give birth to many healthy children, 
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and live by patriotic and above all, Christian principles.61  Tormay’s vision, which came to 
define the official conservative rhetoric on womanhood throughout the 1920s and 1930s, in the 
eyes of the governing twenty-first century political elite came to have renewed relevance in 
Hungarian social and cultural politics.62 
Considering a rapidly aging population, declining marriage and fertility rates along with a 
growing number of non-traditional family formations that the Fidesz government faced, such 
vision, albeit modified for the twenty-first century, was worthy of commemoration.  Fidesz along 
with its coalition party the Christian Democrats made the restoration of the (heterosexual) 
family, composed with a minimum of two children, their highest priority.  This goal was 
institutionalized by the New Constitution, which states the following,  
(1) Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman 
established by voluntary decision, and the family as the basis of the survival of the 
nation.  Family ties shall be based on marriage or the relationship between parents and 
children.  
(2) Hungary shall encourage the commitment to have children.  
(3) The protection of families shall be regulated by a cardinal Act.63 
 
In this context, Tormay’s message, which prescribed deference to authority, devoutness to the 
church, the sanctity of marriage, and the importance of having children, proved as timely as ever.  
Thus, Tormay’s twenty-first century renaissance was intimately tied to the institutionalization of 
a new and conservative perspective on gender and family.  A further testament to this came as in 
March 2012 when a bust was erected in Budapest commemorating Tormay as one of the 
“Greatest Hungarian Women.”64  As Sándor Lezsák, Fidesz MP and vice president of the 
parliament who unveiled the bust noted, “while oeuvres can be silenced for decades, their values 
will always win new existence, as is happening with all of Tormay’s works.”65  The 
commemoration received national media attention.  The public media, which the governing party 
Fidesz controlled along with centre-right news sources, celebrated and praised the occasion.  
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Tormay’s Critics and her Descent 
The occasion of the unveiling of Tormay’s bust also marked a pivotal moment in the 
opposition to Tormay’s rehabilitation.  Although there had been critical voices about the 
(re)emergence of Tormay prior, the physical memorialization galvanized the political left, 
liberal, civil, Jewish, and even lgbtq organizations who criticized the erecting of a public 
monument to a writer who was so virulently antisemitic and expressed concerns about the 
repercussions of such an act.66  Antisemitism was only one of talking points that critics raised 
about Tormay.  Her admiration of fascism was another one.  Critics who opposed her official 
idolization, also frequently cited Tormay’s statement, “I was a fascist before Mussolini ever 
appeared on the horizon.”67  They argued that even if Tormay did not live to see the catastrophic 
outcome of her fascist ideology that should not serve as an excuse for her views.  Finally, across 
oppositionists, with the exception of the lgbtq organizations, people commented on Tormay’s 
alleged homosexuality underscoring the irony of conservatives erecting a statue to a “known” 
homosexual woman.68  All of these voices expressed concerns, akin to those in an article in the 
liberal weekly Magyar Narancs, that by commemorating Tormay as “one of the greatest 
Hungarians” without taking into consideration her personal and political views implied their 
dismissal as significant issues, or even worse, the legitimatization of Tormay’s fascist, 
irredentist, and antisemitic views.69  
In the autumn of 2012, a month after her bust was erected Tormay once again became the 
centre of a nationwide controversy.   This time however, the stakes were much higher. In its 
efforts to centralize power and (re)instill conservative nationalist values Fidesz appointed 
loyalists to major cultural organizations such as the National Theatre as well as to important 
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academic institutions and organizations.70  As part of reorienting Hungary’s cultural and 
scientific values, Fidesz embarked on a reformation of the national educational system, including 
the national core curriculum.  During the preparation, conservatives and importantly Jobbik, the 
far right party both actively lobbied for the inclusion of previously neglected interwar writers, 
including Tormay. 
They argued that with the words of one literary historian, “The new National Curriculum would 
be incomplete and distorted without writers of a Christian worldview who actually dealt with the 
question of national destiny.”71  For many people on the right and in particular on the far right, 
the incorporation of Tormay, along with Albert Wass and others were seen as a corrective to 
communist and post-communist histories—a pivotal recovery of Hungarian writers who spoke of 
a greater Christian Hungary. In their eyes, these previously silenced writers represented “true” 
Hungarianness and also offered a more genuine perspective, one that presented Hungarians not 
as people who quailed after World War I but rather as people who were willing to stand up for 
what had historically been theirs.  Indeed, Tormay appealed to many who felt that because of the 
history of victorious neighbours who benefitted from the Treaty of Trianon, the oppressive 
communist era, and the post 89 so called, Holocaust “remembrance industry”, it was high time 
that public discourse focused on some positive and uniting aspects of Hungarianness.72   
The subsequent national debate over the inclusion of Tormay that played out on all media 
channels was representative of deep schisms about the historical memory of interwar Hungary.  
As a journalist in the Népszabadság, the largest socialist daily poignantly noted,  “thinking in 
terms of the nation, the pain of Trianon and the possibility of revaluation of the Horthy era stirs 
emotional tides in many people.  The Hungarian audience is looking for a stable national 
identity.” 73  Consequently, even critics of Fidesz and the far right recognized that the appeal of 
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Tormay and her works lay in offering a vision of a powerful Hungary with a clear moral and 
social order.  For the right, reintroducing the works of interwar writers was a question of 
historical equity, a long overdue correction of the historical biases of previous political regimes. 
Importantly, they also spoke of a need of reviving the previously silenced era of 
Hungarian history because it would build the right kind of national character.74  But the exact 
kind of national character they were thinking of was rather unclear.  Considering the blatantly 
antisemitic and irredentist militant views of the writers to be included, for liberal and socialist 
critics it was evident that the new curriculum was to endorse an exclusionary, chauvinistic, and 
anti-European worldview.  Not entirely disagreeing with this interpretation, Jobbik and far right 
voices on kuruc.info argued that Tormay along with other interwar writers represented true 
patriotic Hungarianness and should be exalted as historical role models.  For the far right then, 
the antisemitism and irredentist view of these writers were part of their appeal.  That Tormay’s 
personal life (her non-normative gender and sexual behaviour) was not the kind of Hungarian 
national character Jobbik was actively promoting was therefore seen as less important.  
Members of Fidesz and critics close to the government took a more measured approach.  
For instance, while representatives of Fidesz acknowledged that Tormay could have held 
antisemitic views, at the same time they argued that her personal views should not justify the 
exclusion of her non-political novels from the National Curriculum.75  At the same time, 
considering the systematic appointment of government friendly personnel as heads of national 
cultural institutions and the billing of plays and events celebrating real (meaning non-Jewish) 
patriotic, conservative Hungarian writers, the acknowledgment of Tormay’s antisemitism 
seemed more like playing lip service to growing international criticism than a real 
acknowledgement of the problem of antisemitism.76  Furthermore, conservative pro-Fidesz 
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experts such as Mihály Takaró emphasised that for future generations it would be essential that 
writers like Cécile Tormay, who were “true patriots and held a genuinely Christian worldview,” 
be included in the National Curriculum.”77   
Regardless of their political and ideological loyalties, most critics found it amusing (and 
helpful for generating readership) to draw attention to the absurdity of the far right and right’s 
idolization of a “homosexual.”  Articles with headings such as “Jobbik is demanding a lesbian in 
the school texts” poked fun of the far right’s hypocrisy for using Tormay as a national icon 
despite of the fact that she was a “known lesbian.”78  That everyone on the right remained 
strategically silent about the personal life of Tormay did not help to quell those observers who 
eagerly brought attention to the official idolization of an allegedly homosexual woman at time of 
blatantly hostile and discriminatory politics against Hungary’s lgbtq communities.  Since Fidesz 
came into power in 2010, as part of its mission to save so called, traditional “normal” families, it 
instituted discriminatory policies against Hungarian homosexuals.  By defining marriage 
between man and a woman it was the first government that aimed to halt progress on the path to 
sexual equality that the homosexual community had achieved since the decriminalization of 
homosexuality in 1961 and especially since 1989.79  While civil partnership continues to exist 
the 2011 constitution and 2013 civil code were explicit in establishing a hierarchy between 
marriage and civil partnership.80  Fidesz and especially its small coalition partner the Christian 
Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) were intent on institutionalizing protections for their ideal 
family, which were to be defined as a union between married heterosexual adults with their own 
children.  Based on the Family Protection Act passed in 2011 same-sexual relationships (along 
with non-married heterosexual unions) were relegated to secondary status with less protection 
and fewer entitlements.81  While the Constitutional Court subsequently struck down some of the 
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discriminatory elements of the law, in its rhetoric the government remained clear about the 
mutually exclusive nature of family and same-sexual relationships.82 In the words of Pèter 
Harrach, the faction leader of the KDNP, family was “natural” while same-sex civil partnership 
was a “choice.”83 Jobbik went even further, effectively declaring an open war against what they 
see as “homosexual lifestyle.”  Inspired by Russia, in 2012 a Jobbik member of parliament 
proposed an amendment to the Constitution that would have made the “promotion of 
homosexual lifestyle” a criminal offense carrying a possible prison sentence of three years.84  
Nevertheless, despite their sanctification of heteronormativity and campaign against 
homosexuals Tormay’s sexuality posed no issue for either Jobbik or Fidesz.   
In the end, the final version of the National Core Curriculum that came into effect in 
January 2013 does not contain any reference to Tormay or her work.  Amidst loud criticism from 
all corners, including some conservative academics, for FIDESZ strategically it was not worth 
making a crusade of including Tormay in the new curriculum.85  Ultimately, for Fidesz and the 
far right, Tormay’s exclusion was a battle lost but it was by no means representative of a loss of 
the broader political culture war.  
 Following the national curriculum debacle, in May 2013 representatives of Fidesz, 
KDNP and Jobbik supported a petition to rename a district in Budapest after Tormay.  Taking 
place just months after the removal of Tormay from the national core curriculum it seemed like 
naming a district after Tormay was going to be a consolation prize for Fidesz and especially her 
fiercest advocate Jobbik.  Following a petition from the special envoy of the Prime Minister the 
Budapest City Council voted to name a square after Tormay.  Instead of a smooth bureaucratic 
procedure however, the Fidesz backed mayor, encountered disapproval and fierce criticism from 
all corners.  For instance, Ronald S. Lauder, the president of the World Jewish Congress 
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highlighted how the naming of public square after Tormay would fly in the face of Fidesz’s 
promise to curb rising antisemitism,  “This decision by the Budapest city government [...] puts 
into question the pledge given to the Jewish community that anti-Semitism will be fought 
vigorously by the Hungarian authorities.”86  Lauder’s remarks underscored the three part 
political tight rope act of Hungarian politics whereby the far right party and its sympathizers 
were getting increasingly vocal in their antisemitic (and anti-Roma and homophobic) remarks, 
while the governing Fidesz party was attempting to not alienate its right wing voters by openly 
denouncing their racism, and at the same time not spur liberal and centrists national and 
international opposition.  It was this balancing act that Lauder and critics more generally wanted 
Fidesz to stop.  The naming of a public square after Tormay was sending a message that Fidesz 
had no genuine intention of doing so.   
Sensing that public opinion was against it the City Council formally requested the 
Humanities Research Centre of the National Academy of Science to evaluate whether the City 
Council would be justified in renaming a square after Tormay.  Taking place during the 
structural reorganization of the National Academy of Science, which many saw as Fidesz’s next 
step in cementing it’s power, the eventual decision came as a surprise slap in the face to the 
increasingly right-wing government.  Instead of toeing the line the resolution of the Academy of 
Science categorically rejected the legitimacy of representing Tormay as a venerable national 
icon.  According to the resolution,  
Both as a writer and a public figure Tormay was driven by racism and racist principles… 
As an ideologue and a propagator she played a large role in the establishment of the 
intellectual background and social embeddedness of the authoritarian regime… This is 
true despite the fact that she died in 1937, which means that she did not personally play a 
role in the totalitarian system [of the far right during World War II].87  
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The resolution concluded that under no circumstances should any public space be named after 
Tormay. Citing the resolution, the mayor of Budapest conceded and the plan to name public 
spaces after Tormay was dropped.   
Despite receiving national media attention the incident itself represented a relatively 
minor political blow to Fidesz and the Mayor of Budapest.  To all those disappointed in the 
outcome on the right, Fidesz could point to (and blame) the Academy of Science for the decision.  
It was a two-fold win.  In other words, the withdrawal of Tormay’s name showed that despite 
international outcry to the contrary, cultural and scientific institutions were still independent and 
not under the thumb of the government.  Simultaneously, Fidesz could demonstrate to its far 
right voters that it really did try to commemorate Tormay.  The renaming saga was a much more 
significant event in terms of the ongoing cultural crusade to rehabilitate the interwar conservative 
Horthy regime.  That the supreme scientific authority in the country made a clear statement 
describing Tormay as a figure who worked on the “establishment of an authoritarian system” 
was a clear message that the right’s reinterpretation of Hungarian history would continue to face 
opposition.  Despite this, having once again won the election by a landslide in April 2014, Fidesz 
has made it unmistakably clear that it has no intention of stopping rewriting of Hungarian 
history. 88  The glorification of the interwar Horthy era appears to march on.89 
 
Conclusion: “Quo Vadis Hungary?”  
In the first two decades after the democratic changes in 1989 Hungarian politics both on 
the domestic and the international fronts were in favour of integrating Hungary into the European 
Union.  During this time, historians, public intellectuals, and politicians alike could finally begin 
to more openly reassess Hungary’s pre-Communist and Communist histories.  In search for new, 
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more objective historical narratives there was a diversification of viewpoints.  However, 
intellectuals as well as politicians refrained from offering a total revisionist account of interwar 
history, and the Horthy regime continued to be portrayed in a critical light.  In 2010 after the 
landslide victory of Fidesz and after Jobbik became the third largest party in the Hungarian 
parliament, the Horthy era was praised and became framed in a positive light.  Hence, the 
increasingly heated public debates about Cécile Tormay are representative of a broader 
renegotiation of the legacy of the interwar conservative regime she championed.  The 
controversies around the erection of a statue commemorating her as one of the “Greatest 
Hungarian Women,” the debates over introducing her works into the national core curriculum, 
and the re-naming of a public square after Tormay, became heated because they reflected the on-
going revaluation of some of the most contentious periods in of Hungarian history.  
Ultimately, what was perhaps most surprising about the rehabilitation of Tormay was not 
that conservatives and especially the far right found her (along with many other interwar 
figures’) antisemitic, irredentist, strong nationalist sentiments, and traditional gender views 
appealing and timely.  Rather, what was surprising was that they did so without considering, or 
in fact in spite of, the details of Tormay’s personal life, which represented everything 
conservatives and the far right were advocating against.  Namely, a strong independent woman, 
who never married or had children, worked in a male profession and (as all historical evidence 
points to), was also a woman who desired those of her own sex.90  Thus, while Tormay’s 
writings and public work were well-suited to stand for advocating a family centred vision and 
traditional gender norms, her personal life fell noticeably short from the twenty-first century 
conservative and far right ideologies.  Yet, despite a seeming discordancy between Tormay’s 
personal life and the political platform of her twenty-first century revivers, she was 
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unconditionally embraced. In part we can account for this by simply pointing out how both the 
right and the far right claimed ignorance or dismissed questions about Tormay’s personal life as 
irrelevant or a smear campaign by political opposition. Focusing exclusively on her literary 
works and public persona moreover made both Tormay’s gender as well as her sexuality 
irrelevant to their goals.  It was in fact precisely because they ignored Tormay’s sexuality and 
gender that Tormay was able to become a usable figure.  By disregarding that she was a woman 
she could occupy male (literary and public) spheres whereas by ignoring her (non-normative) 
sexuality she could stand for all women and speak for patriarchal policies and views.   
 Placing these approaches in the history of gender and sexuality and in particular in the 
history of official approaches to non-normative sexuality reveals how these twenty-first century 
strategies are far from unique.  Like their far right and conservative historical counterparts in 
Hungary and elsewhere, for Jobbik and Fidesz, an abstract conservative female figure could 
serve not only as a spokesperson for, but also as a representative of their ideal nation.91  Through 
her literary works that portray traditional and complementary norms for men and women Tormay 
has come to symbolize not only Hungarian women but also the Hungarian nation.  Furthermore, 
upholding Tormay’s vision of traditional gender norms as ideal and inspirational while at the 
same time deeming Tormay’s actual personal life irrelevant has been a rule rather than an 
exception.  In their approach to sexuality, twenty-first century Hungarian conservatives and far 
right politicians followed in the footsteps of their interwar and state-socialist counterparts.  The 
imposition of silence around and lack of public engagement with issues of their own members 
and protégés non-normative sexuality cut across the various political systems.  Consequently, 
each of these systems could rally around individuals whose personal and sexual life was outside 
of these regimes’ espoused ideals of heteronormative, family centred social life.  Thus, rather 
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than a novelty, the embrace of Tormay was representative of a long history of idealizing public 
individuals who privately led lives of non-normative sexual or gender conduct. 
 Finally, even those who criticized Tormay’s commemoration did not choose to discuss or 
critically reflect on the issues around Tormay’s sexual orientation.  Using hearsay and one 
newspaper article from the early 2000s that actually described some of the details of the scandal 
in the 1920s, most commentators simply took it for granted that Tormay was a lesbian.  From 
2010 onwards as Tormay’s name was increasingly circulating in the media, socialist and liberal 
politicians, journalists and bloggers alike referred to Tormay’s lesbianism as “public 
knowledge.”  Such nonchalant and uncritical handling of historical sexuality and the scandal 
around Tormay confirmed that sexuality was still, just as it was during the 1920s, primarily a 
tool for political (and personal) purposes.  The opposition’s frequent references to Tormay’s 
alleged lesbianism were not to further lgbtq rights but to mock and undermine Fidesz and Jobbik 
and more generally conservatives’ moral and political authority. Thus, those on the political left 
and liberal side were just as comfortable using sexual orientation for political purposes as those 
on the right.  Serving political purposes aside, the treatment of Tormay’s sexuality reflects the 
enduring homophobia and sexism of the mainstream press.  An illustrative example of this is an 
opinion piece in the socialist daily, Nèpszabadság from 2012, where the author, a former high 
school teacher László Rab discusses why it would be counterproductive to insert a woman “who 
stole the wife of a man” into classroom discussions. How uncomfortable it would be Rab opines, 
“for the teachers to have to explain to 16 year olds that they are reading a book of a woman who 
desired her own sex and to explain details about how she pursued women!” 92  Ultimately, 
considering Tormay’s sexual history Rab questioned how society could realistically expect boys 
to pay attention to the literary qualities of Tormay.  In other words, he assumed that discussing 
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an author who pursued love with her own sex would be too distracting.  Rab’s piece reveals how 
Tormay’s assumed homosexuality could be problematic across the political spectrum.   
 As for Tormay’s sexuality, the case’s legacy as a part of the history of (homo)sexuality 
has yet to be claimed.  On one hand, strict contemporary silencing by the Horthy regime along 
with the subsequent silencing of non-normative sexualities by the post Word War II communist 
regime pose a considerable (although by no means impossible) burden to reconstruct and 
interpret the sexuality of Tormay.  On the other hand, the fact that even the lbgtq community has 
not embraced Tormay is in no small part due to Tormay’s politics.  Tormay’s antisemitic, fascist, 
and irredentist beliefs until recently made her too controversial to be commemorated as a 
foremother for Hungarian lesbians.  
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